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Summary of Key Findings
	c Unconventional hydrocarbon exploration and development (UHED) is considered as a matter of environmental 
governance – concerning the levels and scale of government, decision-making and policy mechanisms across the UK.
	c Devolved Administrations have different powers and responsibilities towards UHED and have adopted different 
stances at different times. 
	c The UK Government adopted three distinct policy approaches. First, precaution after seismic activity was reported 
in 2012 following test drilling by Cuadrilla. Second was promotion when the Coalition and subsequent Conservative 
Governments developed supportive economic and regulatory policy instruments to support development. The third 
is abatement at the point where the potential future breach of seismic activity limits led to an effective moratorium on 
UHED.
	c The promotion phase was supported by supply push mechanisms (to encourage development such as business rate 
recovery to local councils) and demand pull mechanisms (to encourage community uptake, including the Shale Wealth 
Fund and distribution of profits to local communities). 
	c Devolved administrations have now converged on a moratorium consensus, though the justification differs between 
component countries. The UK government relies upon technical justification (seismic activity), Scotland and Wales 
more strongly emphasise public opinion and consultation responses. 
	c Shale gas has been stuck between planning processes for Nationally Significant Infrastructure and local planning 
authority consents and democratic control at the most local level. The failure to capture the appropriate scale of shale 
gas planning hastened the demise of the industry.  
Introduction
This briefing note discusses the issue of unconventional hydrocarbon exploration and development (hereafter UHED) 
as an issue of governance and political scale – concerning the levels of government, decision-making powers and 
responsibilities surrounding shale gas policy and planning in the UK. The shale gas challenge in the UK, as is common with 
many other environmental and energy policy challenges, involves the negotiation of different interests across multiple 
sectors of society in order to achieve policy success. Understanding the different scales of decision-making (see Box 1 
for discussion of core terms) is important for effective environmental governance because many different parties and 
interests must negotiate a politically acceptable form of action, and each represents a different jurisdiction/constituency/
network, and so on. A different type of management at one scale may bring about unforeseen changes at another. An 
understanding of scale is therefore important when tackling an issue like UHED in order to avoid overly simplistic “one-
size- fits-all” recommendations (Ostrom, 2009) that lead to policy failure, social unrest, and distrust in decision-making 
institutions.
In this briefing paper UHED is approached as a scale problem in two ways – the first is on a temporal scale (across time 
periods), in a manner that complements the briefing note of Williams et al. (2020), showing the different approaches 
adopted by government authorities and the critical points at which these changed. The second, is the governance 
scale considered here at two levels – first relating to the relationship between the UK Government and Devolved 
Administrations, and the second between UK Government policy and local/regional tiers of government through the 
localist policy agenda espoused by the Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments. 
Shale Gas Policy Changes Over Time – precaution, promotion and abatement
The technique of hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas is well established in the oil and gas industry, though advances in 
horizontal drilling technology combined with other cost saving measures allowed UHED through so-called ‘fracking’ 
of shales, tight sands and coalbeds to become commercially successful first in the USA, Canada and Australia; and 
encouraged the UK to explore this as an energy policy priority in 2010 (Rogers, 2011). The political significance of this 
move came in August 2010 when the onshore gas exploration and development company Cuadrilla started drilling 
Britain’s first shale gas exploration well, the Preese-Hall-1, and hydraulically fracturing the well in spring 2011. The 
operation triggered two seismic events of magnitudes (M
L
) 2.3 and 1.5, leading to an initial moratorium on activity in April 
2011 to December 2012. This moratorium characterises the first distinct period of contemporary UK shale gas policy 
described here as the precautionary phase. The UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government was mindful of 
social activism and protest emerging in the United States around the rapid expansion of the shale gas industry and wanted 
to ensure public confidence in the socio-economic and environmental benefits of shale gas. The proposed solution was, 
however, what social scientists of science and technology call a technocratic policy response, in the sense that decision-
making was driven principally by engineering expert opinion upon the seismic activity. Policy was heavily influenced by 
the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report into the control of seismic impacts (Bickle et al., 2012) and 
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Box 1. Core concepts 
 
Scale – a form of political hierarchy that is not separate or discrete but interconnected; for example when discussing 
the local, the national, or global economy. Scales are often treated as discrete and separate as they are bounded 
by political jurisdictions (e.g. a local planning authority), or because they have specific borders (e.g. a constituency). 
However, for many environmental issues the movement of things (money, natural resources, pollutants, people etc) 
expand across and negotiates around, scale – making the boundaries porous. 
 
Devolution – refers to the delegation and transfer of political powers to either lower tiers of government (such as 
from central to regional authorities) or to different political jurisdictions, such as the formation of sub-national, or 
sub-federal level administrations. In the UK devolution involves the granting of self-government to the Scottish 
Parliament, Welsh Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly and the London Assembly alongside executive bodies – 
the Scottish Government, Welsh Government, Northern Ireland Executive and for England specifically the Greater 
London Authority and combined authorities. 
 
Localism – refers to a range of political philosophies that emphasise the importance of ‘the local’. Usually localism 
refers to systems of political control that prioritise the smallest units of government – including direct decision-
making by citizens through active participation in community planning and policy-making. It can therefore refer to a 
systematic approach to political organisation – whereby local autonomy is prioritised over a centralized government, 
either through devolving power to local/regional authorities (such as city mayors), or directly empowering citizen 
groups to run public services through private ownership. There are multiple and competing definitions that make 
localism in policy-making a highly ‘plastic’ concept, open to interpretation.  
 
Governance – describes the way in which political processes are maintained or changed in and between both formal 
and informal institutions. For example the relationship between Westminster and White Hall, between ministers 
and civil servants is an example of governance. Environmental governance commonly involves a range of different 
authorities including national, supranational and non-governmental authorities, and increasingly the involvement of 
the public in decision-making processes through deliberative processes. A key example of the latter is the UK National 
Climate Assembly.  
the subsequent tightening of regulatory controls over seismic activity (Green et al., 2012), as a means to provide public 
reassurance. The decision was technocratic, because at this stage no other stakeholders were consulted on the social 
impacts of allowing UHED to continue in the affected regions. 
Once a control mechanism for the monitoring of seismic activity was put in place, the government moved quickly to 
establish a new policy platform. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition in 2012, and subsequent Conservative 
Governments shifted to a second phase – described here as a promoter stance towards UHED (Cameron, 2013; 
Macalister and Harvey, 2013). The promoter phase describes a strategic policy platform designed to support industry 
development and expansion, and to create a domestic market for unconventional hydrocarbons in the UK. The UK 
Government’s promoter stance towards UHED between 2012 and 2019 involved different forms of incentives. The 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat and Conservative Governments adopted four principal policy mechanisms within this 
broader strategy:
1. Supply push – to encourage industry growth by providing a favourable planning and investment environment. Policy 
approaches include, for example: providing 100% business rate recovery for local councils for shale gas development. 
Tax incentivisation mechanisms were aimed at encouraging uptake of exploration licenses at the scale of local 
government decision-making, in part under conditions of economic uncertainty and austerity that depleted local 
government funds in many UHED-affected regions (Cotton, 2017).
2. Demand pull – to encourage market uptake (for example Weijermars and McCredie, 2011), for example by providing 
economic incentivisation to shale gas-affected communities and by emphasising its advantages including: domestic 
energy affordability from lower gas prices to reduce domestic heating costs, improved national energy security in 
the face of geopolitical concerns over gas availability in Europe (Boersma and Johnson, 2012; Williams and Sovacool, 
2020), and improved air quality and lower carbon emissions when transitioning away from black carbon sources (e.g. 
coal/lignite) towards natural gas (see for example Burnham et al., 2012; Jenner and Lamadrid, 2013).
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3. Promote social engagement – efforts to encourage public acceptance of UHED at both national and local-regional 
scales through what is often referred to as social license to operate – a trust relationship built between developer 
and affected community that allows politically ‘frictionless’ extractive operations (Bradshaw and Waite, 2017; 
Smith and Richards, 2015). Social engagement with community groups emphasised the local-regional economic 
benefits to shale gas-abundant communities from job creation and so-called up-skilling for marginalised and 
peripheral communities affected by fracking development (such as the Blackpool and Fylde College fracking 
training centre) (DECC, 2014), as well as community regeneration benefits from shared proceeds amongst producer 
communities from a proposed shale wealth fund (HM Treasury, 2016; UKOOG, 2013) – exploration/testing stage 
to provide £100,000 in community benefits per well-site where fracturing takes place, followed by 1% of revenues 
to communities at the production stage (DECC, 2014). The shale wealth fund amounted to a £10,000,000 windfall 
for affected communities – and was designed to improve community relations, and stimulate acceptance locally by 
encouraging expenditure on facilities such as play parks, community sports facilities, libraries, heritage restoration 
and local transportation (HM Treasury and Andrew Jones MP, 2017) - a mechanism to distribute the profits of 
individual wells to local communities was introduced to counter negative socio-economic impacts and promote public 
confidence (HM Treasury, 2013, 2016; Rabe and Hampton, 2016).
4. Assurance through regulation – the emphasis in government public communications strategy was to emphasise a 
‘robust’ regulatory system with multiple layers of consents in order to ensure work place health and safety, seismic 
monitoring and environmental protection (Hawkins, 2020; Kotsakis, 2012) in order to provide confidence to broader 
civil society actors that the technology was safe. A consultation on changes in planning laws to speed up the 
development of an ‘exploratory phase’ of UHED by bringing regulations in line with ‘permitted development’, and 
secondly to move the ‘production phase’ within the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIP) regime under 
the Planning Act 2008 and Localism Act 2011 was mooted, though ultimately this policy action was not taken forward 
(discussed below); and later abandoned at the point when the moratorium was introduced.
UHED has been extensively studied in terms of public perceptions, media portrayals and policy approaches (Bomberg, 
2017; Clarke et al., 2015; Cotton et al., 2019; Hilson, 2015; Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014; Jaspal et al., 2014; McNally et al., 2018b; 
Szolucha, 2018; Williams and Sovacool, 2019, 2020). Assessment of this literature shows how during the promoter phase, 
the UK Government attempted to stimulate both industry development and local community social acceptance of the 
technology at the same time (notably: Cameron, 2013; Macalister and Harvey, 2013). However, as UHED companies 
began exploratory actions in the northwest of England and the Government embarked upon a pro-shale gas policy 
platform, this stimulated early negative national news reporting and the rapid establishment of globally-connected 
environmental activism networks in the UK. These new networks of anti-shale gas political action were assisted by 
burgeoning social media. Concerns over local environmental impacts predominantly expressed in North America quickly 
filtered into UK national news, with UHED companies such as Cuadrilla quickly labelled as an environmental and socio-
economic threat to communities (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014), spurred by popular media portrayals of environmental risks, 
including (but not limited to) the Gasland™ (Fox, 2011) documentary from the USA. Collectively, the dissemination of 
global experiences of local fracking impacts helped to mobilise anti-fracking collective action in the UK (Bridge, 2012; 
Singer, 2019). This social activism that then emerged at proposed shale gas exploration sites then prompted further 
negative media reporting of the industry (Bomberg, 2017; Cotton et al., 2014; Evensen, 2018; McNally et al., 2018a; 
Whitmarsh et al., 2015). New groups such as Frack Off became influential in shaping the public attitudes (Neil et al., 2018) in 
defining both the nature of ‘the problem of fracking’ and resultant policy solutions; which, in turn have influenced policy-
makers’ perceptions of UHED and of politically acceptable decision-making outcomes (Bomberg, 2017; Cotton et al., 
2014; Wagner, 2014). 
Political opposition to UHED is place-based, in the sense that it has often centred around sites where Petroleum 
Exploration and Development Licences (PEDLs) have been granted and exploration companies such as Cuadrilla, iGas 
and INEOS have sought planning consents for drilling operations. The social activism of anti-fracking protest and direct-
action campaigns in Barton Moss in Salford, Preston New Road in Lancashire, Kirby Misperton in North Yorkshire, and 
Balcombe in Sussex, was facilitated by intense online information exchange and social learning across activist networks, 
integrated with on the ground protest and direct-action campaigns (Brock, 2020; Muncie, 2020; Rattle et al., 2020). 
National energy policy strategy is influenced by local politics, including amongst communities that develop in opposition 
to fracking, because this is the arena through which regulatory and technical dimensions to fracking are being contested 
and scrutinised (Beebeejaun, 2017). Government measures to incentivise UHED have persistently failed to foster 
what social scientists term a local social license to operate – i.e. UHED are not trusted to act in the best interests of the 
communities in which they develop and extract resources (Bradshaw and Waite, 2017; Luke et al., 2018). As a result, UK 
Government support for shale gas as a national policy priority has proven to be politically costly at the sub-national and 
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local level where UHED was proposed or taking place. Moreover, though physical proximity to operations remains a key 
factor influencing opposition to UHED technology (Craig et al., 2019) local protest actions and negative media reporting 
have stimulated a demonstrable decline in national public support for UHED over time (Macnaghten, 2017; O’Hara et al., 
2014; Whitmarsh et al., 2015). The Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) tracks public attitudes 
to energy and environmental topics through waves of public ‘tracker’ surveys. By late 2019 the survey showed that 44% 
of respondents opposed UHED compared to 11% supporting it (DBEIS, 2019a), the lowest reported support figures since 
the survey began. However, these numbers shifted more in favour of UHED the following year, with 36% opposition and 
24% support reported 12 months later (DBEIS, 2020). It is notable, however, that at the time of writing, the technology 
does not currently enjoy popular public support. 
The sustained social opposition to shale gas well sites (notably at Preston New Road in Lancashire and Kirby Mipserton 
in North Yorkshire) and declining levels of broader public support for UHED was consolidated in 2019 in Lancashire 
when a magnitude 2.9 earthquake was recorded. An interim report by the Oil and Gas Authority found challenges in 
predicting the probability and magnitude of future seismic activity linked to UHED operations (OGA, 2019a, b), and as 
such, the Conservative Government withdrew presumptive support for hydraulic fracturing license applications in the 
UK, effectively instigating a moratorium on further UHED. This policy shift described by Labour opposition at the time as 
a policy U-turn (Ambrose, 2019) and election ploy (Cowburn, 2019). Upon a strengthened majority in the 2019 General 
Election in June 2020, then Conservative UK Energy Minister Kwasi Kwarteng MP stated in a BBC interview (cited in 
Hayhurst, 2020):
 
“We had a moratorium on fracking last year and frankly the debate’s moved on. It is not something that we’re 
looking to do. We’ve always said we’d be evidence-backed, so if there was a time when the science evidence 
changed our minds, we would be open to that. But for now, fracking is over.” 
The term “fracking is over” is politically significant because it signals a formal shift in policy strategy – from promotion to 
the third and current phase – abatement, characterised by a moratorium towards new development, and a clear signal to 
energy developers that previous government support for UHED is now withdrawn. This position is a clear reversal of the 
promoter phase, and hence described as a policy U-turn. There are multiple factors that lead to this abatement stance. 
These are discussed in the following sections relating to two core elements:
1. Convergence of policy (moratorium stance) across Devolved Administrations
2. Localism – governance across national and local government scales
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1. Convergence of Policy (moratorium stance) across Devolved Administrations
Devolution in the United Kingdom
Devolution is deeply significant to UHED politics – with impacts felt across energy and environmental policy, planning 
systems and industrial strategy within the United Kingdom. Political devolution in the UK creates what is termed the 
plurinational state – whereby decision-making power shifts towards the subnational authorities, which in turn gain greater 
autonomy, specifically over planning, tax and energy policy as they relate to UHED. Box 2 describes the broad range of 
powers distributed across the Devolved Administrations and the broad areas of policy-making control.
 
Box 2. Devolved Government powers in the UK 
 
Government has two primary functions – the Legislature (that makes laws), and the Executive (that puts them into effect). In the UK 
there are four different legislatures and executives with differing functions and powers: 
 
Executive Powers Legislative Powers
UK Government UK Parliament
Scottish Government Scottish Parliament
Welsh Government National Assembly for Wales
Northern Ireland Executive Northern Ireland Assembly
 
Coordination of Executive functions across Devolved Administrations occurs formally through meetings of the Joint 
Ministerial Committee, through informal discussions and correspondence between counterparts guided by a Memorandum of 
Understanding and Devolution Guidance Notes, and through coordinated Civil Service action that promotes common professional 
standards, complementary approaches to policy making and lines of communication.  
 
Devolved Administrations have Executive and Legislative powers over a range of policy areas including health and social care, 
education and training, local government, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, transport, justice and policing, sports and the arts. 
Some powers over taxation and social security are devolved. The UK government retains powers for defence, immigration, trade 
policy, foreign affairs and constitutional affairs. 
 
Energy and environmental policy is a complex area for devolved power sharing, influenced by a range of overlapping areas of 
planning policy, climate legislation, taxation and industrial strategy, as discussed in this briefing paper.  
Devolution has a complex political history, beyond the scope of this brief; however, it is important to note that up to the 
point at which the Labour Party entered power in 1997, the UK as a whole had a unified planning system and a shared 
energy policy framework, with only minor differences in planning experienced in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Despite 
the devolution of planning powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (and to a lesser extent, London and now 
regional authorities through elected mayors) policy divergence through devolution was minimal until the then Labour 
Government enacted The Planning Act 2008, and then the Coalition Government enacted the Localism Act 2011 
(discussed in Box 3 and in the following Localism section). These two pieces of legislation are significant because they 
reveal a departure from the relatively stable spatial planning and sustainable development policy broadly shared by all 
administrations (Power and Cowell, 2012), in favour of an “anti-planning discourse” that portrays the planning system as a 
key obstacle to economic recovery following the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
Though broader shifts in the planning system have affected the UK as a whole, Devolved Administrations have developed 
sub-national energy policy strategies and targets within this shift – specifically regarding renewable energy development 
in the context of sustainable transitions. However, as Cowell et al. (2017) note, the effectiveness of energy policy changes 
across the Devolved Administrations largely depends on UK-wide systems of subsidy, shared support for a system of 
large-scale energy technology platforms, and the centralisation and expediting of planning consents. In short, across 
each of the component administrations there is a move to produce large-scale power stations, large-scale renewable 
projects (particularly in the Scottish case for offshore wind developments) and nationalised infrastructure for electricity 
and gas transmission, whilst drawing planning powers away from local planning systems towards central authorities. All 
Devolved Administrations have therefore encountered challenges related to the contradiction between national and 
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local scales of planning policy. What differed (up to the November 2019 decision in England for a UK wide moratorium, 
and the decision in 2020 to uphold that continued approach) was the stance on UHED, specifically, as an energy policy 
strategy with Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish devolved administrations breaking away from the Coalition/Conservative 
government policy strategy in a number of crucial respects. The connections between territories, regional boundaries 
and tiers of government authority make the policy landscape highly complex. This is because devolved Administrations 
in the UK typically have since drawn UHED and other aspects of energy policy into a platform of nationalist politics 
(specifically in Scotland) (Heffron and Nuttall, 2017; Stephan, 2017); and so too the Westminster government has drawn 
UHED into electoral politics within England (Cowburn, 2019). UHED has thus become politicised as a form of electoral 
politics, with “for-or-against fracking” used as a political platform for election campaigning across the parties (Dodsworth, 
2017). 
UK Government Powers
The primary policy mechanism relevant to individual shale gas sites is the Petroleum Exploration and Development 
Licence (PEDL). PEDLs were granted to companies pursuing a range of oil and gas exploration activities, subject to 
necessary drilling/development consents and planning permission. The PEDL licenses were awarded across 230 onshore 
licence areas, covering a total of 529 blocks (UKOOG, 2019). The UK Government retained overall responsibility for the 
fiscal regime and regulation of the oil and gas industry. In 2015 the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) was created to act as the 
sector’s independent regulator: to “regulate, influence and promote the oil and gas industry, in order to maximise the 
economic recovery of the UK’s oil and gas resources.” The OGA regulates the licensing of exploration and development of 
the UK’s offshore and onshore oil and gas resources, gas storage and unloading activities. This then relates to prevailing 
legislation - The Petroleum Act 1998 confers all rights to the UK’s petroleum resources to the Crown, since 2015 the 
OGA is able to grant licences that confer exclusive rights to search, bore for and retrieve gas and petroleum, over a 
limited area for a limited time. Though this provides national levels of control, this too has become a devolved matter. 
For example, The Scotland Act 2016 confers onshore oil and gas licensing powers, which were devolved on 9th February 
2018. Commencement of sections 47 to 49 of the Scotland Act 2016 transferred powers to legislate for the granting and 
regulation of onshore licences, determine the terms and conditions of licences, and to regulate the licensing process, 
including administration of existing onshore licences. 
The regulation of unconventional oil and gas through fracking overlaps with that of conventional oil and gas. The 
Petroleum Act 1998 established a licensing system whereby companies wanting to conduct offshore, or onshore 
exploration and production would apply for a Petroleum Exploration and Development License (PEDL). Until very recently, 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC, now the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
DBEIS) was responsible for formulating the UK’s energy policy and for administering and enforcing the fracking regulatory 
system (Priestley, 2018). However, in 2015 a new regulator, the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) was created to oversee the 
oil and gas industry, including shale gas. Initially, the OGA was located within the Department for Energy and Climate 
Change as an executive agency until the Energy Bill 2015-16 established it as an independent regulator from 2016 . It had 
the power, alongside the Secretary of State for awarding onshore and offshore oil and gas licenses. Whilst the devolved 
administrations had the power to award onshore licenses (and do so in a similar manner to that of the UK Government), 
Westminster retains the right to grant offshore contracts. This situation led to Wales and Scotland suspending onshore oil 
and gas contracts but witnessing offshore expansion and exploration in their territorial waters. 
Devolved Powers
As shown in Box 2, The Scottish Parliament and Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies have a varying range of legally 
devolved powers on matters including education, employment, the environment, healthcare and transport. Shale gas as 
an environmental, planning and energy policy issue has recently become a devolved matter in its own right. The OGA’s 
short-term governance of oil and gas in particular has been affected by devolution. The Scotland Act 2016 and the 
Wales Act 2017 transferred onshore petroleum licensing to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly and their 
respective ministers . It is notable that Northern Ireland’s UHED regulation remains a matter of Westminster control. The 
Petroleum (Production) Act (Northern Ireland) 1964 had already granted Stormont the legal power to award onshore oil 
and gas licenses, making it the first part of the UK to gain these devolved powers (Priestley, 2018). In this context, there are 
evidently commonalities and differences in the regulation of unconventional oil and gas. 
Across all the UK Government and Devolved Administrations, an almost identical planning process across the five themes 
is followed, before commencing onshore oil and gas development. Operators wishing to drill a well must obtain a license 
from the relevant government body; the OGA in England, the Energy and Climate Change Directorate in Scotland, the 
Minister for Environment Energy and Rural Affairs in Wales and the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment 
in Northern Ireland   (OGA n.d.; NI.Gov n.d.; The Scottish Government n.d.; Welsh Government n.d.). Operators must 
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then negotiate access with landowners. Planning permission must be sought from the local minerals planning authority 
(MPA), the local planning authority (LPA) if in Scotland or the Department of Environment Planning (DOE) (now, the 
Department for the Economy). Operators must then consult the several relevant bodies including environmental 
agency; the Environmental Agency (EA) in England, Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in Scotland, Natural 
Resources Wales (NRW) in Wales; or the Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA) in Northern Ireland, to establish 
the necessary permits and authorisations for the operation. Applications are only granted if the relevant agency is 
confident that impacts to the environment have been ameliorated in a manner compliant with relevant legislation. All four 
Administrations adhere to ISO 14001, the international standard for environmental management systems (nqa n.d.).
There are also a number of additional permitting-relevant bodies that require notification, notably The British Geological 
Survey (BGS) or the Geological Survey of Northern Ireland (GSNI) must be notified of the intent to drill. The safety of 
the well design is scrutinised by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or Health and Safety Executive Northern Ireland 
(HSENI) who must be satisfied with the well design. The operator must also arrange an examination of the well design 
by an independent and competent well examiner. An environmental permit is required from the relevant environmental 
agency for any borehole drilling as well as fracking activities. The Health and Safety Executive or Health and Safety 
Executive Northern Ireland then monitor the well’s progress with these bodies notified of any unplanned events. If 
necessary, these bodies will also carry out on-site inspections of specific well operations (Gov.UK 2013b).
Overall the structures of permitting process are relatively standardised across the devolved administrations, with 
broadly comparable levels and types of permits and consents required in each country, with the authority for permitting 
differing between each country. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences. In England, Scotland and Wales for 
example, the environmental risk assessment is a first stage process and is conducted, as a matter of good practice, 
whenever UHED is planned. In Northern Ireland however, this process comes after the Department of Enterprise, Trade 
and Investment have approved the drilling operator. Whilst operator approval does not invalidate the environmental risk 
assessment, it does suggest de facto approval of the operation (ibid.,). 
Similarly, in England, Scotland and Wales, a pre-application consultation takes places with the local minerals planning 
authority and other key consultees (principally, water and energy suppliers). This incorporates discussions on issues such 
as noise pollution, ecology, archaeological and visual impact and site access. However, the planning process in Northern 
Ireland does not require these discussions on operational best practices. However, the biggest changes to the UK UHED 
context have been the Devolved Administrations political response to their new powers and the process of fracking. 
England 
England had, until November 2019, the only onshore operational fracking site in the UK situated near Little Plumpton in 
Lancashire. The test well, operated by Cuadrilla since 2011, was forced to halt operations on numerous occasions due 
to breaching seismic activity regulations, most recently in August 2019 when an earthquake with a magnitude of 2,9 was 
recorded (BBC News, 2018a; 2019a; Gavell, 2019). The UK Government’s response was initially to consider relaxing the 
safeguards which are designed to halt production when these earthquake events occur (Ambrose, 2019), though these 
relatively strict controls have remained in place. Cuadrilla indicated that it would test for gas at a second well on the site 
but would not start testing until the OGA investigation into the recent seismic activity have been completed. Outside 
of Lancashire, England was witnessing further exploratory work to expand the nation’s operational sites. In June 2019, 
exploratory investigations uncovered the UK’s largest onshore gas field at West Newton in East Yorkshire (Winter 2019) 
whilst several other firms held Government licenses to start shale gas exploration in the region (Burn 2019).
In August 2019 a magnitude-2.9 quake close to Blackpool was attributed to UHED operations by Cuadrilla prompting an 
investigation and interim report by the UK OGA (OGA, 2019a). The report concluded that in the future, larger tremors 
couldn’t be ruled out, which could cause unacceptable “damage and disturbance” to local infrastructure including roads 
and buildings. Then Business Secretary Andrea Leadsom MP stated that the report made it “clear that we cannot rule out 
future unacceptable impacts on the local community”. It is this OGA report that established the political grounds for a 
moratorium in England. On the face of it, the seismic activity generated by shale gas activity is the principal concern that 
justifies continuation of the UK moratorium, and hence the June 2020 statement that the conversation on fracking had 
‘moved on’ in England in absence of further scientific evidence to support safe UHED. 
Scotland
Despite devolution, Scotland has relatively limited powers within the overall energy policy domain (Cairney et al., 2019). In 
Scotland one key policy factor relating to UHED was The Scotland Act 2012 that provided the Scottish Government with 
new tax powers, allowing greater opportunity for the Scottish authorities to raise public funds and pursue a domestic 
policy agenda primarily focussed upon transport, social welfare, and healthcare spending. However the Scotland Act 2012 
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only allowed greater control over public spending within Scotland, though this remained within budgetary constraints 
set by Westminster, tax and spend policy had to take place within the context of a balanced budget – there remained 
therefore a considerable vertical fiscal imbalance (revenues do not match expenditures across the different levels of 
government – with Scotland spending proportionally more than the HM Government). This made the issue of oil and gas 
revenues a highly politicised matter, particularly during debates within the Scottish Independence Referendum campaign 
in 2015. Offshore oil and gas revenues are defined geographically, with North Sea oil and gas predominantly falling 
within Scottish territorial control. The tax revenue that this would provide to an independent Scotland was a key pro-
independence policy platform, though as noted by the Scottish government in Figure 1, these revenues remain in overall 
decline (though notably with evidence of some recovery as global oil and gas prices have returned to a bull market). The 
Independence Referendum is significant, because as Stephan (2017) notes, the Scottish Government’s initial reaction to 
domestic UHED was a cautious “evidence-based approach” - following closely scientific evaluation of the environmental 
impacts of shale gas based upon ongoing review of international evidence and response to central UK Government 
policy. This is significant in relation to Reap’s (2015) analysis, that shows the UK government has largely positioned UHED 
governance in relation to the regulatory and industry practices prevalent in the USA. However, differences in population 
density and the prevailing geological conditions in the UK, mean that the public health impacts recorded in the USA 
cannot be directly extrapolated to the UK, and yet the UK Government has not (until November 2019) displayed evidence 
of a precautionary approach, preferring instead to rely upon engineering solutions and management of industry practices 
through regulation in order to overcome any problems faced (Williams et al., 2020). It is in this regard that we see a key 
convergence between broader UK UHED policy, and the progression of Scottish UHED policy, in that both have become 
more precautionary over time. 
Figure 1. Scottish oil and gas revenues over time
Though Scottish UHED policy can be characterised by precaution, it is important to note that it is also, as previously 
mentioned, a matter of territorial politics. During the Independence Referendum the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
established political (and discursive dominance) and minimised short-term electoral risks from both the Labour and 
Conservative parties in Scotland. It then established a dominant anti-Westminster political rhetoric which served to 
undermine the Scottish Government’s more pragmatic, science-based approach, by emphasising Scottish resistance 
to the UK’s pursuit of shale gas. As Stephan (2017) argues, Scotland exhibits a dual identity with regards to overall energy 
policy, being both a major oil and gas producer and committed to hosting a substantial and rapidly growing renewable energy 
industry. Energy resource production in Scotland has been in a state of transition, with change from fossil fuel extraction 
(principally coal) to onshore/on-land renewables fractured and partial – influenced by both market competition and broader 
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policy shifts since the 1970s (Slee, 2020). The former power of the oil and gas industry both as tax revenue source and major 
employer in Scotland, was a key driver in the early consideration of onshore UHED in Scotland. Stephan (2017) argues, that 
this was a period of technology emergence. In May 2011 Composite Energy revealed a plan for a test well in Airth, and by 
November 2011 the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency had granted a licence to Greenpark Energy for test drilling at 
Canonbie. However, this then took place in the context of broader concerns over activities in Preston, following the seismic 
activity near Preece Hall in Lancashire that led to a moratorium by the UK Government, and so Scottish policy followed an 
increasingly precautionary approach, first by introducing new planning measures for UHED projects in June 2014, and then 
an independent report the following month. The timeline of Scottish policy progression is shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2. The progression of Scottish unconventional oil and gas policy. 
This twin approach of both evidence-based policy and territorial politics begins with The Scottish Government establishing 
an Independent Expert Scientific Panel to examine the overall approach to UHED, with a report published in 2014 (Minister 
for Energy, 2019). These findings, alongside a public consultation, helped lead the Scottish Government to announce a 
moratorium on onshore unconventional oil and gas in Scotland in January 2015. This was followed by the Scottish Parliament 
voting in favour of this position in October 2017 (ibid.,) after further devolution of powers following the Scotland Act 2016 
the moratorium was upheld despite a legal challenge by the petrochemical firm INEOS in summer 2018. The Scottish 
Government is currently undertaking a Strategic Environmental Assessment to fully set out its preferred policy position 
surrounding onshore UHED. Following the Independence Referendum the Scottish Labour Party (itself an opponent of all 
UHED-related activity) calls for impact assessments and local referenda on all fracking planning applications, but the Scottish 
Government, buoyed by anti-Westminster sentiment following the Independence Referendum, and in preparation for a 
general election in 2015, calls for a moratorium upon permissions for all new onshore UHEDs. Stephan (2020) describes 
this as phase of stalemate. We can understand this as a process of political non-decision-making – rather than take 
decisive action on overtly ideological grounds (such as by suggesting that all UHED is unsustainable from a climate change 
perspective as Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green opponents did in the 2015 General Election); the SNP continued to 
outwardly adopt a scientific evidence review-based approach, with the input of public consultation. This pushes the decision-
making framework away from electoral politics, whilst maintaining SNP political credibility (i.e. avoiding charges of hypocrisy) 
in the face of a supportive policy platform towards offshore oil and gas. 
In March 2016, however, Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon publicly stated scepticism towards UHED development, 
and continued to move towards a precautionary approach, stating in the election manifesto that fracking would only 
be permitted if developers could prove that it would not be harmful to the environment or to public health. This stood in 
opposition the UK Government’s push towards streamlining shale gas policy towards a permitted development model, 
in which the presumption in favour of fracking as a matter of sustainable development is outlined in the National Planning 
Policy Framework and the subsequent alignment of local and national planning policies to promote shale gas a national 
public good (as mentioned in the introduction and in the subsequent section on localism below). 
Of additional significance was the Scottish Parliament elections in 2016. As with the case across the UK, public support 
in Scotland for UHED was falling, and it was becoming a more significant issue amongst Scottish voters (Stephan, 2020). 
Moratorium 
January 2015
	c Consideration of primarily localised factors (transport, air pollution, seismic activity, 
socio-economic impacts, role of site decommissioning and abatement).
	c Limit discussion of climate change impacts
Public consultation. 
January-May 2017
	c Broad ranging public and stakeholder responses 
	c Climate change become a stronger part of the debate
Evidence review. 
Summer 2017
	c Consider range of policy options
	c Permit UHED/ban UHED/continue moratorium and continue evidence review
Scottish parliament 
decision. October 2017
	c Scottish government bans UHED using existing devolved powers
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Thus following the 2016 Scottish Parliament election, in June 2016 the Parliament passed a non-binding resolution 
in favour of a permanent ban on UHED; though the Scottish Government led by the SNP continued an evidence and 
consultation-based approach, publishing research results on the environmental, socio-economic, public health and 
transport impacts of UHED, and beginning a public consultation in January 2017. By October 2017, the SNP announced 
that the moratorium on shale gas development has become a permanent ban, and thus was the first of the Devolved 
Administrations to clearly announce a cessation of political support for UHED.
 
Wales
The situation in Wales closely mirrors that of Scotland. In 2015 Wales became subject to an effective moratorium upon UHED. 
Former Natural Resources Minister, the late Carl Sargeant AM wrote to councils to reinforce that there was a temporary ban on 
UHED applications in 2015. In 2015 he stated that fracking technology was “unproven”, saying Welsh ministers preferred to look 
at renewable energy technology alternatives. However, though this was a policy preference, at the time there was discussion 
that the Welsh Government did not have the power to ban UHED, and that ministers could be open to legal challenges, if they 
refuse to give permission for applications, unless planning guidance is updated (BBC News, 2015).
Opposition to UHED within Welsh politics takes place against a background of major protests mounted against multiple energy 
infrastructure projects in recent years. For example, in May 2011, 1500 people gathered on the steps of the National Assembly 
for Wales in Cardiff, the Senedd, to protest against the building of large-scale wind and electricity transmission infrastructure 
across rural Wales. Since its inception, the Welsh assembly has been a keen supporter of sustainable development strategy, 
with emphasis both upon large scale infrastructure projects for renewable generation (including wind and tidal projects) as well 
as grassroots innovation and community energy (Stevenson and Richardson, 2003). As a country with a rich history of fossil 
fuel development, and an antagonistic approach to policy development between the Labour governed Welsh Assembly and 
the Conservative majority in Parliament, the modernisation of the planning system to promote a streamlined UHED consents 
process was politically controversial. A public consultation on petroleum extraction policy in Wales was held between July and 
September 2018 in which most respondents backed the Welsh Government’s draft policy statement not supporting new 
licensing or support for fracking applications. As a devolved policy matter, powers for development consent and licencing were 
transferred in 2018 from the UK Government under the OGA to the Welsh Government.
As the part of the transfer of powers The Cabinet Secretary set out the preferred policy in July 2018, that the Welsh 
Government would not support any applications for hydraulic fracturing consents or undertake any new petroleum licensing 
in Wales whilst a national consultation on petroleum extraction was underway. The public consultation closed on 25th 
September 2018 after receiving 1800 responses. After considering the feedback (see Miller Research, 2018), the Welsh 
Government announced on 10th December 2018 a confirmation response that they will adopt their proposed policy to:
 
“Not undertake any new petroleum licensing in Wales, or support applications for hydraulic fracturing 
petroleum licence consents.” 
The Welsh Government then put a Notification Direction in place so that local authorities cannot approve planning 
applications for unconventional oil and gas, including fracking, without Welsh Ministers’ approval. This supports the Welsh 
Government’s opposition to unconventional extraction. The policy position dovetails with the new edition of the Planning 
Policy Wales (PPW), to reinforce an effective ban on fracking in Wales. Local councils that would be likely to approve 
applications for UHED would now be referred to the environment secretary. The upshot of these national-regional scale 
policy decisions is an effective moratorium on shale gas development in Wales that stands as of January 2021.
Northern Ireland
As with Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland’s control of its offshore licensing remains with the UK Government. Yet 
despite having had the ability to award licenses for onshore oil and gas drilling since 1964, Northern Ireland does not have 
any operational fracking sites. 
For the most part UHED has not been a prominent feature of Northern Irish environmental and energy policy, though inward 
investment from onshore oil and gas exploration and development companies have recently brought renewed political 
scrutiny. In May 2019, Tamboran Resources, a UK-Australian firm, applied for a license to drill for natural gas in Co. Fermanagh. 
The same company had also sought licenses in Co. Leitrim in The Republic of Ireland 2012 and 2014. Councillor Mary Bohan 
is a Fianna Fáil local area representative in Co. Leitrim and called upon the public to object to the application during a local 
authority meeting in June 2019, and asked Leitrim County Council to make a submission that will reflect the impact fracking 
in Co. Fermanagh will have on the county. Bohan was involved in the anti-fracking campaign in the county which began in 
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2013 and this action was instrumental in the Government’s decision to introduce a fracking ban in the Republic of Ireland 
in July 2018. In essence, the actions of grassroots political efforts at the local scale in Northern Ireland have been effective 
in pushing UHED off the national scale agenda. However, it must be noted that a key complicating factor for NI policy 
making is the collapse of Stormont Assembly in January 2017 which has left control of Northern Ireland domestic affairs in 
Westminster. Thus, the recent 2019 announcement of a moratorium on UHED in the UK, applied to NI as well. 
Key Summary Points
	c Devolved administrations have specific powers to grant development consent to UHED applications under an 
umbrella of the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Planning regime, that remains broadly similar in each of the 
component administrations of the United Kingdom. Each Administration favours major infrastructure planning 
processes through centralised administrative control. 
	c UHED has become highly politicised between authorities, with national politics and voter preference becoming 
important aspects of the Devolved Administrations’ relative positions on shale gas. Each of the administrations of 
the UK have taken a different route to assessing the political viability, economics, health and environmental impacts 
of shale gas development, with Scottish and Welsh Administrations adopting a consultative approach leading to 
precautionary measures and moratorium, and the UK Government focusing more specifically on seismic activity 
monitoring and regulatory processes. 
	c Despite differences in approach to consultation, policy making and industry support, there is eventual convergence 
upon a policy of moratorium and hence an effective ban upon fracking activities across the UK as a whole.
2. Localism – governance across national and local government scales
UHED affects multiple scales of political governance. It is treated on one level as a national energy policy strategy – 
covering issues such as domestic energy affordability (lowering gas prices to reduce domestic heating costs), improved 
national level energy security in the face of geopolitical concerns over gas availability in Europe (Boersma and Johnson, 
2012; Mason et al., 2015; Rogers, 2011), and improved air quality and lower carbon emissions when transitioning away from 
black carbon sources (coal/lignite) towards natural gas (see for example Burnham et al., 2012; Jenner and Lamadrid, 2013). 
It is also relevant to local-to-regional economic policy in terms of the benefits gained in shale gas-abundant communities 
from job creation and up-skilling (notably the Blackpool and Fylde College fracking training centre) (DECC, 2014), and from 
community regeneration benefits from shared proceeds amongst producer communities from a proposed shale wealth 
fund (HM Treasury, 2016; UKOOG, 2013). The planning processes for UHED cut across national energy policy strategy and 
local developer applications for planning consent. UHED therefore intersects national and local government plans and 
policies, making it an issue of multi-scalar politics discussed in the following section. 
At the national scale, UK energy policy focuses upon the consolidation of a centralised, national-scale, and ‘big 
infrastructure’ approach to issues to the so-called energy trilemma of security, affordability and decarbonisation (Bridge 
et al., 2013; Bridge et al., 2018; Cotton, 2011, 2019; Groves et al., 2013; Johnstone and Newell, 2018; Johnstone et al., 
2017). Within this, UHED has been positioned as a ‘bridge’ or ‘transition’ fuel within a broader shift in sustainable energy 
transitions (Cameron, 2013; Cotton et al., 2014; Hilson, 2015; Jackson et al., 2014; Sovacool, 2014), and a component 
of national industrial strategy priority since 2012. On the other hand, UK planning policy has been promoted as 
‘localist’ in the sense of encouraging greater involvement of local communities and the devolution of powers in local 
economic and social development away from central government control (Evans et al., 2013; Layard, 2012). There is a 
fundamental incompatibility between these two approaches – and UHED has been a crucial policy-making arena where 
national and local policy strategies have collided, leading to ultimate policy failure (Burns et al., 2016).  
Localism, UK Planning Policy and Shale Gas
The concept of localism is relevant to UHED policy. In UK politics, localism commonly refers to a systematic approach 
to governmental structure that prioritises decentralisation of power to local scales of government. Localism has 
played a key role in changes to planning governance across Europe, promising greater economic efficiency and more 
effective administration by improving the responsiveness of elected authorities to local needs and priorities. In the UK, 
as Tait and Inch (2016) note, localism has been introduced by successive governments as a means to enhance political 
participation and promote new forms of empowered ‘community governance’. 
Localism in policy-making has multiple definitions – encompassing decentralised service delivery, community ownership, 
participatory decision-making, local involvement in development planning, and the stimulation of community social capital 
(Briffault, 2000; Mohan and Stokke, 2000). Tait and Inch (2016) argue, that localism and community empowerment have 
been features of successive Government initiatives; though in UK politics localism became strongly associated with the 
Conservative government’s so-called Big Society policy agenda that favoured community empowerment, the redistribution 
of power from the state to citizens, and the promotion of a culture of volunteering and active community citizenship to 
replace state-run services. The Big Society Agenda, through which the Localism Act 2011 (see Box 3) was the delivery 
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vehicle, aimed to “promote decentralisation and democratic engagement…. [by] end[ing] the era of top-down government 
by giving new powers to local councils, communities, neighbourhoods, and individuals”. The Localism Act confirmed the 
Coalition Government’s intention to devolve power and decision-making responsibility to “elected local representatives, 
frontline service professionals, social enterprises, charities, co-ops, community groups, neighbourhoods and individuals…
[who are] best placed to find the best solutions to local needs” (Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015). Though championed during 
Cameron’s Coalition Government, the approach was criticised because it overlooked the role that the state plays in social 
justice, because it largely assumed that “active citizens” would take up services traditionally offered by local government 
(through philanthropy and volunteerism), and therefore seemed to offload public service responsibilities to community 
groups during a period of economic austerity (Catney et al., 2014; Kisby, 2010). Thus concern was raised that localism would 
simply shrink the state and co-opt local organisations in the delivery of national policy (Davoudi and Madanipour, 2015), 
reducing public service provision by transferring responsibility to neighbourhoods, community and third sector organisations 
to manage delivery (Buser, 2013). The Big Society Agenda as it was known, quickly fell by the wayside, and disappeared from 
mainstream policy strategy, though the Localism Act has remained relatively unchanged since its inception a decade ago.
 
Box 3 Major infrastructure planning legislation  
 
The Planning Act 2008 was intended to streamline the processes for planning approval to major new infrastructure 
projects (sometimes called megaprojects) such as motorways, airports, harbours, and large-scale energy facilities 
such transmission lines, nuclear power stations and large wind farms. It concerned the authorisation of projects 
for the development of nationally significant infrastructure, alongside specific provisions in town and country 
planning, and provision for the imposition of a Community Infrastructure Levy. The Act designates the ‘need case’ 
for major infrastructure through a series of National Policy Statements (NPS); private developers then propose major 
infrastructure projects in lines with the relevant NPS. The most controversial element of the Act was the setting up 
of the Infrastructure Planning Commission – an independent body to oversee consents processes, removing powers 
from local planning authorities and the Secretary of State.  
 
The Localism Act 2011 – Then Prime Minister David Cameron stated about the IPC that: “this quango is going to be 
almost entirely divorced from the processes of democracy. That is wrong. People need a planning system in which 
they feel they have a say – both at national and local level. That is why this Bill is getting such widespread opposition 
from so many different quarters”. The Coalition Government introduced the Localism Act which replaced the IPC’s 
decision-making authority with the Secretary of State. The SoS responds to recommendations from the Planning 
Inspectorate. National Policy Statements can also be vetoed by the House of Commons under the new legislation. 
The structure of the process for development consent is outlined in figure _.  
Figure 3 – The Nationally Significant Infrastructure Planning Process
Policy strategy
Government publishes a National Policy Statement 
which sets out the need for the Nationally Significant 
Infrastrcuture Project.
The NPS is subject to Parliamentary Scrutiny and public 
consultation.
Developer application
Individual promoters/developers submit proposals for 
NSIPs and submit to the Planning Inspectorate for review.
As part of the submission the developer must consult 
local communities and interested parties on the details 
and show the Planning Inspectorate where change have 
been made.
Examination
The Planning Inspectorate makes recommendations of 
acceptance to the relevant Secretary of State within 9 
months of beginning examination of the proposal. 
During examination, interested parties have additional 
opportunities to share their views on the application.
Decision
The Secretary of State must decide whether to grant the NSIP proposal a Development Consent Order which would 
allow the project to proceed. 
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The Localism Act is the core aspect of localist planning policy that related to UHED. The Localism Act 2011 is a 
continuation of the modernisation agenda within infrastructure planning that began under the former Labour 
Government, with the Planning Act 2008. Together, the two planning policies are mechanisms that reveal a change 
within the philosophical outlook towards planning processes and the separation of planning and politics. These 
two legislative instruments “re-scale” the process of decision-making on major energy technology and planning 
developments from that of local environmental protection to that of national public interest (Bentley and Pugalis, 
2013; Cotton, 2011, 2019; Johnstone, 2010; Johnstone and Newell, 2018). As mentioned above, The Planning Act 2008 
‘streamlined’ planning consents for major infrastructure projects deemed to be of national significance (including 
major roads, airports, ports, power stations and electricity/gas transmission and telecommunications infrastructure). 
The legislation was supported following a series of slow and expensive major infrastructure projects – notably including 
the Heathrow Airport Terminal 5 (that involved a planning inquiry that cost £80m, heard 700 witnesses, generated 
100,000 pages of transcripts, sat for 524 days and took eight years from first application to government approval), 
the Sizewell B nuclear power station inquiries, and the Lackenby-Picton-Shipton power line in the north of England 
inquiries, each of which were expensive and antagonistic between local communities and developers (Cotton, 2014). 
The Planning Act 2008 was designed to allow these types of projects to come to fruition much faster and at lower 
industry and public sector cost. The Planning Act 2008 removed the powers of planning consents processes from 
local authorities to an independent body – the Infrastructure Planning Commission. The ‘need case’ for infrastructure 
was established under the Planning Act 2008 through consultation and development of a National Policy Statement. 
Infrastructure is first designated as a “nationally significant infrastructure project” (NSIP) under the Planning Act 2008. 
A developer must then apply for a development consent order (DCO) (which effectively removes the need to obtain 
several consents that would otherwise be required for development, such as planning permission and compulsory 
purchase order). Under Labour it was the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) that had the power to make 
consent order decisions, but the Coalition Government deemed this to be undemocratic (see Box 3). A part of the 
localist political agenda of the Coalition and Conservative governments, there was a desire to reduce the number of 
quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (quangos) whilst strengthening the capacity of the of the core 
executive (cabinet) and sponsor departments to control and co-ordinate governance (Flinders et al., 2014). As a result, 
the Localism Act 2011 allowed the Coalition government to replace the decision-making authority of the IPC with that 
of The Secretary of State as the final authority to approve or decline a DCO application. The SoS is, in turn, advised by 
an “Examining Authority” arranged by the Planning Inspectorate and must have regard to the relevant National Policy 
Statement to which the application pertains (Smith, 2017). The Localism Act 2011 and subsequent provisions created 
an inherent contradiction – it encouraged local participation, but simultaneously removed local authority planning 
control over large energy technology projects. 
UHED has been on the margins of the NSIP planning regime since 2012. Local planning authorities (particularly in 
Lancashire) have been subject to intense political scrutiny over their planning decisions on UHED, and (from the 
perspective of local authorities) interference in democratic outcomes by central government. As Jennifer Mein, leader 
of Lancashire county council argued in the Guardian in 2016 (Mein, 2016):
It is clearly a very emotive subject… locally elected representatives … took their responsibilities in considering 
these applications very seriously and exercised their duty to the best of their abilities… that is what local 
democracy should be about: local people making decisions about the big issues that affect them.
One of the key themes promoted by central government in recent years has been localism, promoting the 
advantages of devolving power to communities up and down the country… It is right and proper that this 
country’s planning regime enables applicants to appeal against decisions that go against them. And as 
part of that process, the secretary of state has long had the power to recover the final decision. However, 
it is easy to understand the frustration felt by those who opposed the applications, and now find their local 
representatives overruled by the secretary of state… [he] has made very clear its determination to see shale 
gas exploited on a large scale.
Then Communities Secretary, Sajid Javid, made national headlines when he accepted an appeal from Cuadrilla against 
an earlier decision to turn down their plans to extract shale gas resources on the Fylde in Lancashire. The position 
was explicitly anti-localist in the sense that the democratically taken decision at the local authority level was over-
ruled by a higher tier of government. Central government frustration over the apparent slowness at which decisions 
were being made by local authorities (and the lack of support for UHED in general) led to plans to move the shale gas 
production process into the NSIP process. This move to change the status of UHED in planning policy leads to the 
second important driver of the localist policy agenda in planning - The National Planning Policy Framework. The NPPF 
constitutes guidance for local planning authorities and decision-takers both in drawing up plans and as a material 
consideration in determining applications. Importantly, it is not part of the Localism Act - it is a more loosely defined 
‘framework’ for planning policy rather than a specific plan (Hayes, 2012). The National Planning Policy Framework’s 
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paragraph 14 presents a ‘golden thread’ of presumed consent under conditions of sustainable development that 
runs throughout all planning decision-making – public participation is a core aspect of this consents process. 
Participation allows localism through greater community-level control, but this always carries the risk of protest against 
development. For example, as Hawkins (2020) notes, the Draft Spatial Framework for Greater Manchester states 
that UHED will not be supported, though this is in potential violation of the National Planning Policy Framework, which 
presumes planning consent on sustainable development grounds (should the current moratorium be lifted in the 
future). Interpretation of presumed planning consent on sustainable development grounds is problematic, however, 
because fossil fuel developments (of any sort) run counter to legally binding commitments for low carbon development 
planning under the Climate Change Act 2008 (Hilson, 2015). Moreover, environmental issues that constitute local-
scale impacts (such as micro-tremors) or international scale impacts (such as greenhouse gas emissions) are handled 
by different scales of governance within planning and regulatory systems, and planning authorities exclude certain lines 
of evidence if it relates to the wrong scale – for example, as Williams (2018) shows, in planning inquiries into fracking 
site construction in Lancashire, lines of evidence pertaining to national policy (such as those related to climate change 
impacts) were excluded as being beyond the remit of the local authority. 
The friction between central and local government was exacerbated in August 2015 when Greg Clark MP and Amber 
Rudd MP issued a joint statement that introduced a new approach to fast-track planning applications for UHED – 
stating that appeals against any refusals of planning permission for UHED or against non-determination will be treated 
as priority for urgent resolution, with potential input by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government; 
potentially calling in shale gas applications using powers contained in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and 
considering each case upon its own merits in line with this policy. The Secretary of State also reserves a right to identify 
underperforming local planning authorities (defined as those that fail to grant or fail to decide upon UHED planning 
applications) and determine the application in the authority’s place. Over time, the Conservative Government sought 
to draw further planning powers to the centre and thus speed up applications for UHED, leading a consultation on a 
proposed policy move to bring major shale gas production projects into the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project 
(NSIP) regime set out in the Planning Act 2008 and Localism Act 2011, and thus place UHED within the streamlined 
process, and effectively circumventing local authority control. If successful, the proposal would have fundamentally 
rescaled UHED to nationally significant infrastructure and changed the level of government at which the decision was 
taken. Such an approach has been criticised as taking decision-making power away from local communities in favour of 
presumptive planning consent in line with national energy policy and industrial strategy goals, violating local community 
rights to autonomous consent, access to public participation and environmental justice within the planning system 
(Cotton, 2017). However, within the consultation, proposals to bring UHED planning in line with the NSIP process were 
met with strong opposition. 83% of respondents objected to the move, largely due to the view that this involved the 
removal of local decision making and local democracy. Respondents also claimed that moving shale gas production 
into the NSIP regime would contradict the UK’s climate change objectives and could lead to adverse environmental 
outcomes. Recommendations made in the Communities and Local Government Select Committee report stated that: 
“it is our view that while the UK shale industry remains at an early exploratory stage including the production phase into 
the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) regime would be premature” (DBEIS, 2019b). As a result, the plan 
for greater statutory control by Government over shale gas site planning was dropped. 
Key summary points
	c Localism has been a key part of successive government policy –presented as a political means to empower 
communities over local decision-making, to provide local plan making and infrastructure development, and 
conversely, to streamline infrastructure plans for major projects.
	c Shale gas planning at the local level remained under significant pressure from the UK Government, because local 
inquiries and other forms of development control were seen as ‘too slow’ and running counter to the Government’s 
objective to promote the shale gas development phase. 
	c Issues of local democratic control over UHED decisions are crucial to the fairness and social acceptability of shale gas 
decision-making. Social license to operate is an important aspect of shale gas development consent – it is a nebulous 
trust relationship between communities and extractive industries that has no legal standing and is thus largely ignored 
by UK developers (Bradshaw and Waite, 2017), and yet the lack of social licence has led to sustained public opposition 
in UHED well sites, and a broader decline in public support over time. 
	c Though shale gas is under effective moratorium status across the Devolved Administrations, the issue is paused 
rather than finally resolved. We have moved from a promoter phase to an abatement phase across all components 
of UK policy. However, if the shale gas question is reopened across Devolved Administrations in the future, then 
issues of local democratic control and public participation at the community level will remain important criteria for the 
technology’s success. 
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